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Abstract
Four models are developed and tested in this 
study. The first two models deal with arms trade, and 
the other two deal with military expenditures. The 
most important finding of this study is political 
freedom has a very strong effect on both arms trade 
and military expenditures in Eastern Europe. The more 
free a country, the less likely it is to have high 
levels of arms trade overall, as well as import arms. 
Also, the higher the level of political freedom, the 
lower the value and intensity of military 
expenditures.
All of the models were tested for Eastern Europe 
a whole as well as for the individual countries of 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary,
Poland and Romania.
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1.0 Introduction
1.1 Question and Significance
The newly elected Bush administration is making 
international headlines these days by pushing for the 
development of a national missile-defense system. Such 
a system, most would agree, is a violation of the 1972 
anti-ballistic missile treaty signed between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. Opponents of the 
shield argue its development could lead to a new arms 
race and send military expenditures spiraling out of 
control.
A recent report entitled "Recent Trends in 
Military Expenditure" published by the Stockholm 
International Peach Research Institute (SIPRI) reports 
that military expenditures are once again increasing 
after a 10-year period of decline (2001). This 
increase in military expenditures began in 1999 and 
continued into 2000. It, is important to note this 
increase is not restricted to certain regions of the 
world, rather every region has seen an increase in 
military expenditures since 1999.
2Thus far, trade in arms does not seem to be 
following suit. In a separate report, Recent Trends in 
Arms Production, SIPRI notes that arms trade has been 
on the decline since 1989 (2001). For example, in 
1970, arms imports as a percentage of total imports 
was 2.1 for all of the Warsaw Pact countries. The 
percentage of total exports made up of arms exports 
during that same time was 5.7. In 1994 the percentage 
of arms imports was down to 0.2 and the export 
percentage was down to 1.4.
The year 198 9 was a very significant one in the 
international politics and economics. The fall of the 
Berlin wall and the rapid disintegration of communist 
governments in Eastern Europe brought about many 
significant changes in the international community.
Whereas the communist governments generally 
restricted trade in Eastern Europe to trade amongst 
communist countries, the new democratic governments 
pushed for increasingly open trade with all countries. 
As a result, overall trade volumes in Eastern Europe 
have been increasing as has the ratio of traded goods 
to GDP, commonly referred to as openness to trade.
3As one can imagine, the collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe has sparked a number of questions about 
the future of global economics and politics. Many have 
studied the region's emerging trade patterns in areas 
such as agriculture, manufacturing and services. There 
has been some research done on the changes in arms 
trade; however, most of the research was done soon 
after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. This study 
will explore the changing trade patterns in military 
expenditures and arms trade that have emerged since 
the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.
Two main questions will be addressed in this 
paper. The first question is "what factors influence 
arms trade in Eastern Europe?" This question can be 
broken down into two separate sub-questions. The 
first being "what variables appear to affect the 
overall volume of arms traded in Eastern Europe?" The 
overall volume of arms trade is defined as the total 
dollar value of arms imports and exports in each of 
the Eastern European countries.
Realizing that all trade, including arms trade, 
is a two-way process, the second part of this question
4asks, "what factors influence whether a country is a 
net importer or exporter of arms?" This is essentially 
defined as the difference between the dollar value of 
arms imported by these countries from the dollar value 
of arms exported.
The second question is, "what factors influence 
military expenditures in Eastern Europe?" This 
question can also be broken down into two separate 
parts. The first is "what factors have influenced the 
overall volume of military expenditures in Eastern 
Europe over time?" The volume of military expenditures 
is defined as the total dollar value of military 
expenditures spent by the governments of the Eastern 
European countries.
The second part is "what factors influence the 
intensity of military expenditures in Eastern Europe 
over time?" The intensity of military expenditures is 
defined as the ratio of the dollar value of military 
expenditures to the dollar value of GDP in those same 
countries.
The answers to these questions are significant 
for many reasons. Beginning with the second question,
5many in the international community consider a 
reduction in the amount of money spent on military 
items an important policy goal. Former President 
Eisenhower once said, "Every rifle being made, every 
launched naval vessel and every fired missile.is after 
all theft of the people who are hungry and not fed, 
who are cold and not clothed" (Broek 1998). While not 
all would agree with this statement, it is at least 
partially true. A government only has so much in 
resources to work with; if more of this money is 
allocated to military expenditures, it only follows 
that less money is available for other projects that 
may be of importance including welfare programs, 
education, and health care programs.
If we can learn what factors are conducive to an 
increase in the overall volume of military 
expenditures, we may be able to take measures to 
lessen or even eliminate the presence of those 
factors. Directly related to this,, if we can learn 
what factors are conducive to a decline in military 
expenditures, we may be able to take measures to 
promote the existence of those factors.
6While many may consider a reduction in military 
expenditures as a step in the right direction, perhaps 
another equally, if not more, important goal is 
reducing the emphasis placed on military expenditures 
within an economy. As GDP increases, it would not be 
surprising to see all components of GDP to rise also, 
including military expenditures by the central 
government. What is also important to analyze is 
whether the growth in military expenditures is 
outpacing the growth in GDP. A good way to look at 
this is to see how the ratio of military expenditures 
to GDP changes over time.
Looking at what factors influence the volume and 
intensity of military expenditures may be important; 
however, a subset of this is arms trade. The volume of 
arms trade is also an important statistic. It may 
provide us an idea of what countries are expecting to 
need, and perhaps use, weapons. Related to this, it is 
important to note whether a country is a net importer 
or a net exporter of weapons.
If a country has decided to export weapons this 
could be a signal that the government of that
7particular country does not foresee the need to be 
using those arms in the near future, either for 
offensive or defensive purposes, so they are being 
shipped out of the country. This is assuming, of 
course, the traded arms were not produced for trade.
Granted, this may not always be the case. 
Sometimes a net surplus of weapons exports may simply 
mean that domestic arms production is greater than 
domestic arms consumption. In the case of Eastern 
Europe, the production of small arms for trade is on 
the increase (United Nations 2000) .
If a country is also decreasing the total value 
involved in arms trade, this could also be an 
indication that governments are expecting a more 
peaceful future. This could be a positive sign, 
signaling a more peaceful period in the region. 
Granted, it could also mean that competition is 
greater in the weapons industry.
Conversely, if a country begins to import weapons 
on a larger scale or begins to devote more resources 
to a higher percentage of arms trade, these could be 
signals that the government of that country is
expecting to need more arms. This could be, perhaps, 
in response to a perceived external threat, thus 
prompting the need for more defense mechanisms, or it 
could be an indication the government plans to launch 
its own offensive maneuvers.
Once again, this may not always be an accurate 
interpretation of the situation. Perhaps domestic 
production of arms was reduced or even eliminated for 
some reason; this could be a plausible explanation for 
an increase in arms imports over arms exports.
However, since the volume of domestic arms production 
in Eastern European countries has changed very little 
over time, it is more likely that an increase in arms 
imports, may be the signal of a heightening arms race. 
For example, if a threat is suddenly perceived, a 
government may not have the time necessary to step-up 
domestic arms production. Instead, the government may 
decide to import arms from other countries in order to 
compete in the arms race.
Predicting whether a country is likely to be a 
net importer or a net exporter of weapons in the 
coming years can be a useful tool in determining
9whether the near future of a particular region will 
tend to be more peaceful and stable, or more 
confrontational and unstable.
1.2 Background
There are a number of reasons why the region of 
Eastern Europe is an important area to study regarding 
these issues. First of all, these countries 
(Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania) were once part of the "Iron 
Curtain" that was installed by the Soviet Union to 
help guard against an invasion of the USSR by Western 
forces. These countries were not actually part of the 
former USSR, however their economic and political 
structures were designed to closely mirror those of 
the Soviet Union.
For example, all of these countries operated 
under some form of a centrally planned economic 
system, rather than a free-market based economy. All 
of the countries in question also were under the 
influence of a government operating under a communist 
philosophy of governance. These countries were also 
once part of a common agreement called the Warsaw
10
Pact. The Warsaw Pact of 1955 was primarily an 
agreement meant to protect and strengthen the 
Communist philosophy, however some military purposes 
were also served by the pact (Mastny 2001).
Similarities in the economic and political 
infrastructure of these countries is desirable, as it 
will help to minimize potential noise in the data.
When working with data, an assumption of ceteris 
paribus, meaning all else being equal, is made. The 
more similarities there are between the countries from 
which the data is collected, the more likely the 
assumption of ceteris paribus is to be true.
Former Iron Curtain countries are also important 
to study, as they have been more successful in 
creating stable democratic states and freer economic 
systems than have their former Soviet counterparts, 
with the exception of the Baltic states. If these 
countries are more likely to continue to build upon 
their newly established political and economic 
systems, the results of this study will be more 
relevant than if the states reverted back to their 
Soviet-style past.
11
This is because the results of this paper are 
intended to identify what factors are conducive to a 
reduction in arms trade and military expenditures; 
traits which are normally associated with non- 
Communist regimes, of course the US and France are 
notable exceptions.
Previously, it has been thought that Eastern 
Europe was not a desirable region for serious 
statistical study due in part to the difficulty of 
obtaining reliable data. This thought has changed in 
recent years, with the opening of data archives and 
other valuable research materials to the rest of the 
academic world (King 2000). Also, records from 
Eastern Europe tend to be more easily accessible and 
reliable than data for the former Soviet states.
2.0 Literature Review
2.1 Gravity Model
The empirical framework behind one of the models 
is the gravity model of trade. The gravity model is 
used to predict the volume of international trade.
The basic structure of the gravity model uses trade 
volume as the dependent variable and incorporates the
12
trading partners' GDP, geographic proximity, and 
general barriers to trade (Bergstrand 1985).
The gravity model has been a part of economic 
thought for many years now. Tingbergen first applied 
this model in a 1962 paper, followed by Poyhonen in 
1963.
Despite the wide use of the gravity model, some 
have criticized the model for lack of a strong 
theoretical foundation. Studies by Anderson (197 9) and 
Bergstrand (1985)have concluded there are no inherent 
problems with the model and also have provided a 
microeconomic foundation for the model. A later study 
by Deardorff (1995) has also strengthened the 
credibility of the model by showing it is consistent 
with both the neoclassical and Ricardian traditions.
Since then, many economists have incorporated the 
gravity models in their studies. One of these 
economists is Kalirajan (1999). Kalirajan uses data 
for Australia and its trade partners during the years 
1990 through 1994 to analyze trade relationships with 
countries on the Indian Ocean Rim. Kalirajan uses the 
gravity model to estimate potential trade and
13
concludes that those countries with fewer trade 
restrictions were better able to capitalize on their 
trade potential.
Wang and Winters (1992)also use the gravity model 
to predict overall trade in Eastern Europe using data 
from 1989 to 1992. The authors conclude the increased 
openness to trade that is emerging in Eastern Europe 
will not significantly affect trade between Eastern 
Europe and developing countries, but should 
significantly increase trade with industrialized 
countries such as the US.
One economist who does look at the application of 
the gravity model to Eastern Europe is Nagy (1997). 
Similar to Wang and Winters, Nagy also use data since 
the collapse of communism in 1989 through 1995. Nagy 
concludes the gravity model is indeed a reliable 
predictor of trade in Eastern Europe.
Summary (1989) also uses the gravity theory to 
analyze US bilateral trade. Summary runs two separate 
regressions to see what factors have the greatest 
effects upon US imports and exports. Summary concludes 
there are many political factors that influence trade
14
in addition to the commonly accepted economic factors. 
Interestingly, one of these political factors is arms 
transfers. Summary found that arms transfers are 
highly significant in determining import and export 
volume in an economy. This study is similar to 
Summary's in that I also believe that political 
factors as well as economic ones have an impact upon 
arms trade and military expenditures.
The encouraging results of the many studies done 
using the gravity model in predicting overall levels 
of trade have prompted me to see if the theory can be 
applied to a specific subset of trade, arms trade. 
There has been a great deal of research on and use of 
the gravity model, however there seems to be an 
absence of research applying the gravity model of 
trade to specific subsets of trade. More 
specifically, there does not seem to be any academic 
literature relating arms trade and the gravity model.
There is a rather large body of literature 
dealing with issues of arms trade in general, and the 
economic implications and foundations of it. Some of
15
the research that has been conducted on the issue of 
arms trade is summarized in the following section.
2 .2 Arms Trade
The recent international debate over the United 
States' proposed missile defense system has once again 
brought the issue of arms trade to the forefront of 
policy debate. Many argue that if such a system is 
developed by the United States, a new arms race may 
result.
Of course, the debate over arms trade and its 
impact is nothing new. Li and Mirmirani (1998) analyze 
the effects trading military and arms technology has 
on economic growth. The findings of Li and Mirmirani 
indicate there is a fairly strong negative correlation 
between those two variables.
The fact that Li and Mirmirani have found a 
correlation between economic growth and arms trade 
implies that arms trade may be something controllable. 
Therefore, if we can determine what factors influence 
arms trade, we may be able to manipulate those factors 
in order to reduce the volume of arms trade in the 
world.
16
Mussington (1994) has done a great deal of 
research on the supply side issues of arms trade, and 
he also finds that controllable variables do, in fact, 
influence arms trade. Among Mussington's findings is 
that government actions, such as taxation, influence 
arms trade by affecting how much resources are 
available for the trading of arms.
Harkavy (1994) analyzes three recent historical 
eras with distinctly different international systems. 
These periods are the interwar period (between World 
Wars I and II), the Cold War period, and the post-Cold 
War period. Harkavy found the post-Cold War period 
does share many similarities with the interwar period. 
In both of those eras, Harkavy argues arms trade has 
become de-politicized and de-nationalized.
Brzoska and Pearson (1994) also note that the 
United States' current position as the sole remaining 
military superpower has a definite impact on the arms 
trade. Taking a supply-side perspective, Brzoska and 
Pearson note the United States is likely to remain the 
leading arms supplier, due in part to the political 
and economic uncertainties that exist in Russia. While
17
this article was written in 1994, the conclusions are 
arguably still true today, as economic and political 
uncertainties are still prevalent in Russia.
Catrina (1994) argues that arms transfers should 
be the central theme of research on arms in this new 
era. Catrina argues for a more descriptive approach 
to analyzing the changing system of arms transfers, as 
opposed to a more statistical one. Part of his 
rationale behind this is the lack of reliable 
statistical information available. While this may have 
been a valid argument in 1994, vast strides have been 
made to make reliable data from Eastern Europe more 
easily obtained.
The arguments made by Harkavy, Brzoska and 
Pearson, and Catrina lend support to the argument that 
economic factors may be more influential in arms trade 
than in the past. Whereas arms trade used to be almost 
exclusively a political issue, more and more economic 
factors are being introduced in arms trade models, 
replacing or complementing political ones.
Many studies have been done on Russia's arms 
trade, including two studies by Khripunov. The first
18
study, published in 1994, noted that there would 
likely be some major changes in the arms trade game in 
Russia since democracy and capitalism have taken hold.
Khripunov (1999) noted that the Cold War was the 
primary motivation for Russia to export arms during 
that time. Now that the Cold War is over, Russia does 
not have to export weapons in order to protect its 
national interests. Khripunov also notes that Russian 
economic policy makers have recently decided to export 
weapons in order to boost a failing economy.
Khrutsky and Latypov (1997) also look at arms 
trade in Russia, noting that the future of the Russian 
defense industry is, at best, uncertain. Berryman 
looks at the role of the black market in Russia's arms 
trade game (2000). Very few authors have focused on 
Eastern Europe's arms trade.
If one is concerned with the military activity in 
a particular county, region, or in the world overall, 
it is reasonable to want to be aware not only of 
issues related to arms trade, but also to a more broad 
issue: military expenditures. While arms trade has 
seemed to receive the bulk of academic attention,
19
there does exist some valuable work on military 
expenditures.
2.3 Military Expenditures
Broek (1998) and Kempster (1998) have both 
presented research on the impact of peace movements on 
military expenditures. Both of these authors, in two 
separate studies, have concluded that the stronger the 
peace movement in a country, the lower the military 
expenditures.
Other economists have examined military 
expenditures in certain countries. Thomas Scheetz 
(1996) analyzed 1969-1995 data from Guatemala and 
concluded that military expenditures have a negative 
effect on GDP growth. One of the reasons Scheetz 
believes this relationship holds is that military 
expenditures in Guatemala monopolized scarce resources 
which were unavailable for use in productive economic 
sectors.
Sezgin (1998) analyzes military expenditures in 
Turkey during the years 1956 through 1994. In the case 
of Turkey, Sezgin concludes that military expenditures 
are conducive to economic growth; and the major
20
determinants of military expenditures are GDP, civil 
strife, and the military expenditures of rival Greece.
In addition to individual sets of authors, there 
are also international organizations that specialize 
in the analysis of military expenditures. One of these 
organizations is the Ottawa Symposium. The theme of 
this symposium was "Military Expenditure in Developing 
Countries: Security and Development." Four different 
regions of the world were discussed in this symposium: 
South Asia, Southern Africa, Central America, and the 
Horn of Africa. There was no work presented on 
Eastern Europe or the Newly Independent States (NIS). 
One of the purposes of this study is to help fill this 
noticeable lack of research on military expenditures 
in Eastern Europe.
In sum, previous research has shown that both 
political and economic factors influence arms trade 
and military expenditures. Very little research has 
been done on arms trade and military expenditures 
Eastern Europe exclusively, a fact this paper intends 
to help change.
21
3.0 Empirical Models and Data
3.1 Model A
The first model will be developed in order to 
predict the overall volume of arms trade in Eastern 
Europe and will be referred to as Model A. The volume 
of arms trade is defined as the total dollar value of 
arms imports and^exports in the region. The data for 
exports were obtained from two sources: the U.S. State 
Department's publication World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers (WMEAT) , and various issues of the 
CIA World Factbook.
A gravity-like model will be the operational 
theory on which this model is based. In most cases, 
the gravity model is used to explain the exports of 
one country to another and is a function of each 
country's economic and geo-political traits. Due to 
data limitations, I have modified the theory from its 
conventional use to analyze broad trade patterns to a 
more refined use in analyzing arms trade.
Model A will be defined as:
• TTRADE-po+PiLNGDP+p2LNOPEN I p3LNPFI+p4LNMILES+|l
22
The dependent variable for this model is the total 
trade in arms in Eastern Europe (TTRADE). Model A has 
four explanatory variables: GDP, distance from Moscow 
prior to the collapse of the USSR or from Brussels 
after the collapse (MILES) openness to trade (OPEN) 
and a political freedom index (PFI). Where possible, 
logs of the above variables were used and are 
indicated by an "LN" in front of each variable name. 
The models were also estimated including dummy 
variables for time, such as DUM70 for the year 1970, 
DUM71 for 1971, etc. However, the dummy variables were 
not included in the country-specific regressions.
The estimations for Eastern Europe as a whole are 
presented in addition to the estimations for all six 
countries included in the study. For Eastern Europe, 
the number of observations is 164. There are seven 
different countries that are included in the data, 
with the years ranging from 1970-1997. More recent 
data was not available for arms trade.
In sum, Model A is not a true gravity model, as 
it does not use the trade between two countries as the 
dependent variable, but rather the total arms trade of
23
the entire region. However, I have incorporated some 
of the explanatory variables normally associated with 
the gravity model into model A. Both nominal GDP of 
the trading countries and geographic distances are 
explanatory variables that can be found in traditional 
gravity models and model A.
Upon analysis of the data, I expect to find a 
positive correlation between the level of arms trade 
and GDP. In other words, I expect the volume of arms 
trade will increase as GDP increases. Many of the 
previously mentioned studies have found a positive 
correlation between the volume of trade between 
countries and their GDPs. I do not expect this 
relationship to hold up for arms trade, at least not 
in Eastern Europe. As was mentioned in the SIPRI 
article, arms trade has been on the decline since the 
late 1980s, while GDPs have been on the rise.
The data for each country's GDP was also obtained 
from various issues of WMEAT and the CIA World 
Factbook. The data was from various years and needed 
to be adjusted for inflation. This was accomplished 
using the GDP deflator provided on www.dismal.com.
24
The gravity model hypothesizes the closer the 
economic centers of countries are to one another, the 
higher the volume of trade will be between those 
countries. For Model A, this will be modified to 
account for the distances between centers of military 
power. During the existence of the USSR, the distance 
between each country's capital and Moscow will be 
factored into the model. After the dissolution of the 
USSR, distance from Moscow will be replaced with 
distance from Brussels, signifying a shift in 
influence from the USSR to NATO.
Based on the rationale behind the Warsaw Pact, I 
expect to find a positive correlation between the
r
volume of arms trade and distance. The Warsaw Pact was 
intended primarily to promote the communist 
philosophy, however a secondary purpose was military 
in nature (Mastny 2001). Military strategy would 
dictate that the strongest, most reinforced areas 
should be in place around the target one most wants to 
preserve. Therefore, those countries closer to Moscow 
would likely be more heavily armed than those further 
away. It is important to note, however, that not all
25
of the members of the Warsaw Pact followed Moscow's 
military directives with the same level of obedience. 
Romania especially did not follow these directives 
(Bacon 2001).
I expect the positive correlation to hold true 
when distance from Brussels is substituted for 
distance from Moscow. True, Brussels would want to 
have more concentrated arms nearby rather than afar, 
but since Belgium is not the primary weapons trade 
partner of Eastern European countries, I do not expect 
the relationship to be quite as strong.
A third explanatory variable included in model A 
is openness to trade. For the purposes of this study, 
openness to trade is defined as the dollar value of 
exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP. Most of 
these values were obtained from the Penn World Tables, 
however more recent data (1993-1999) was calculated by 
myself using data provided in Nations in Transit 1999- 
2000: Civil Society, Democracy and Markets in East 
Central Europe and the Newly Independent States.
Openness to trade is an important variable 
because it may be an indicator of how incorporated a
26
country is in the growing global economic and 
political systems. The more integrated a country is, 
the more leverage the international community has to 
encourage or discourage certain behaviors by that 
country. For example, if a country is highly 
incorporated in the international system, it is more 
likely to submit to arms reductions treaties in order 
to maintain favorable standing in the economic 
community. In other words, there may be a negative 
correlation between arms trade and openness to trade.
On the other hand, a positive correlation between 
openness and arms trade is possible. Part of the 
reasoning behind this is the arms trading partners of 
Eastern Europe tend to be more industrialized 
countries rather than developing countries, and that 
is the situation where Wang and Winters (1991) found a 
positive correlation between openness and total trade. 
If a country is more open to trade, it is rational to 
expect the volume of trade to increase (Kalirajan 
1999).
Wall (1999) looks at the various trade barriers 
the United States has erected against various
27
countries in the rest of the world including import 
policies, administrative barriers, government 
procurement, intellectual property and other barriers 
to trade. Wall looks at these barriers both 
collectively and separately to see what effects those 
barriers have on US imports and exports. He concludes 
that barriers to trade do indeed decrease the overall 
level of trade.
A final explanatory variable included in model A 
is political freedom. Research by both Kempster (1998) 
and Broek (1998) support the claim that the peace 
movement affects military expenditures and arms trade. 
The peace movement is likely to be stronger in 
countries with greater political freedom, as more 
repressive countries are more likely to squash peace 
movements. The values for political freedom are taken 
from an index published in Nations in Transit 1999- 
2000. The values range from one, which represents the 
highest level of political rights and civil liberties, 
to seven, which represents the lowest possible level. 
The data used in the regression will be the index
28
values for all of the countries analyzed over all of 
the years in question.
One of the many questions I intend to answer with 
this study is how communist-style regimes influence 
arms trade and military expenditures. I have 
introduced political freedom as a proxy for Communism 
in all of the models developed in this study. Some of 
the countries involved in this study, such as Romania, 
still tend to have a rather sizeable post-communist 
influence, while others, like Poland, do not.
Whether there is a positive or negative 
correlation between political freedom and openness to 
trade remains to be seen. It is possible that the more 
repressive a regime, the higher the level of arms 
trade and military expenditures, as in the cases of 
China and the former Soviet Union. On the other hand, 
countries such as Great Britain and the United States 
are arguably quite free, but still have comparatively 
high levels of arms trade and military expenditures. 
Also, the studies by Broek (1998) and Kempster (1998) 
support the hypothesis that more political freedom 
will lead to less military expenditures.
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3.2 Model B
Model B is similar to model A in that it looks at 
an aspect of arms trade. Whereas model A is developed 
to predict the overall level of arms trade in Eastern 
Europe, model B is developed to predict whether or not 
the region will be a net importer or a net exporter of 
arms. The data for this dependent variable were 
obtained from various WMEAT publications and from the 
CIA World Factbook.
Model B is specified as follows:
BOT=p0+PiGDPGR+p2LNOPEN+p3LNPFI+jJ.
The dependent variable in this model is the balance of 
arms trade (BOT) as defined by arms exports minus arms 
imports. There are three independent variables, the 
growth rate of real GDP (GDPGR), openness to trade 
(OPEN) and political freedom (PFI). po is the constant 
term and jj, is the error term.
The first explanatory variable used in model B is 
the growth rate of GDP. Li and Mirmirani (1998) 
analyze the effects trading military and arms 
technology has on economic growth. The findings of 
Mirmirani and Li indicate there is a correlation
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between those two variables. I have incorporated the 
growth rate of GDP in model B due in part to the
findings of Li and Mirmirani.
I expect to find a positive correlation between 
an arms trade surplus, meaning that exports exceed 
imports, and economic growth. Once an economy begins 
to grow, policy makers are likely to want to sustain
that growth. One of the ways that GDP can increase is
if exports are greater than imports, or even if a 
trade deficit begins to shrink. An exception to this 
general rule is the United States. Exporting weapons 
can help sustain economic growth. Therefore, I expect 
to find a positive correlation between the growth rate
of GDP and an arms trade surplus.
Not everyone subscribes to this hypothesis. 
Khripunov (1999) notes that the Russian economic 
policy makers have recently decided to export weapons 
in order to boost a failing economy. However, Russia 
is not Eastern Europe. For the most part, Eastern 
Europe has enjoyed much more prosperous times than
Russia and the former Soviet states. Also, this may be
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a temporary action by Russia in desperate times, 
however we cannot be sure.
Khripunov himself noted this is a temporary 
phenomenon and that Russia's primary motivation for 
being a net exporter of weapons (to protect and spread 
Soviet style communism) has disappeared. Governments 
who operated countries under this ideology tended to 
squelch free trade and political freedoms.
As the need for arms declines in the region, countries 
are faced with a surplus of weapons for which Eastern 
European leaders may not see a need.
With this in mind, I expect to see countries 
become net exporters of as economies begin to grow, as 
markets begin to open, and as political freedoms begin 
to blossom. Therefore I have included openness to 
trade and political freedom as explanatory variables 
in model B.
3.3 Model C
The dependent variable in model C is the total 
dollar value of military expenditures in Eastern 
Europe. These values were once again obtained using
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the WMEAT publications as well as the CIA World 
Factbook. Model C is specified as:
ME=po+PiGDPGR+p2LNOPEN+p3LNPFI+p4LNNATO+jLi 
where Po is the constant term and p. is the error term. 
The dependent variable in this model is total military 
expenditures (LNME). Three of the explanatory 
variables have been used in previous models: growth 
rate of real GDP (GDPGR), political freedom (PFI) and 
openness to trade (OPEN). A fourth variable is 
introduced in this model, affiliation with NATO 
(NATO). Once again, the model was tested both with and 
without dummy variables for time when estimated for 
Eastern Europe as a whole.
For the most part, the same variables that 
influence arms trade should also have an influence on 
military expenditures. Military expenditures is 
defined by NATO as capital expenditures on:
(a) The armed forces, including 
peacekeeping forces;
(b) Defense ministries and other government 
agencies engaged in defense projects;
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(c) Paramilitary forces, when trained and
equipped for military operations;
(d) Military space activities 
Civil defense, veterans' benefits,
demobilization, conversion and weapons destruction are 
not included in the figures (SIPRI 2001, "Sources...) .
This definition of military expenditures is used in
compiling the data in both the WMEAT and SIPRI 
publications.
Investment in arms is one aspect of military 
expenditures, albeit a more specialized subset. 
Therefore many of the same economic and political 
variables that have been found to be important factors 
in the arms trade will also be important with regard 
to military expenditures as a whole. As a result, many 
of the same variables will be incorporated into the 
models of arms trade and military expenditures that I 
have devised and tested in this study.
The growth rate of real GDP will be included as 
an explanatory variable. The 1997 Ottawa Symposium on 
Military Expenditures and Growth presented evidence 
supporting theories that claim military expenditures
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and development are indeed correlated. If these 
variables are related in areas of the world such as 
South Asia, Central America and Africa, it is 
reasonable to see if the relationships also apply in 
Eastern Europe.
Political freedom will also be included as an 
explanatory variable in model C. The primary purpose 
of the Iron Curtain was to act as a shield against 
Western socio-political penetration into the Soviet 
sphere of influence [specifically the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO)]. With this in mind, it is 
rational to expect these countries would need to have 
a higher level of military expenditures and arms in 
order to serve the purpose of defending the Soviet 
Union and the overall communist philosophy.
As communism and the USSR decline, so do the odds 
that Western forces will attempt to invade. With this 
understood, there is less need for the Eastern 
European countries to be armed; therefore, military 
expenditures should decline during this time. These 
hypotheses are based, in part, on the findings of 
Khripunov (1994, 1999).
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As was mentioned earlier, openness to trade can 
also be used as a proxy for communist influence, 
therefore I have again incorporated openness to trade 
as an explanatory variable. I expect to find a 
negative relationship between military expenditures 
and openness to trade.
In order more fully capture the impact of 
communism on military expenditures, I have included a 
variable for affiliation with NATO in both models C 
and D. As membership or partnership with NATO 
increases among Eastern European countries, the value 
and intensity of military expenditures should 
increase. Eastern European countries join NATO, there 
is less of a threat of military aggression against 
these countries so there is less of a need for an arms 
stockpile, however NATO does stipulate that members 
increase their military expenditures to a certain 
level. Partners do not necessarily have to increase 
the levels as much as full-fledged members 
(www.nato.org) . Should any of these, countries become a 
victim of external aggression, other members of NATO 
are obliged to come to the assistance of the
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victimized country. As a result, there is little 
incentive to increase military expenditures beyond the 
levels, dictated by NATO.
3.4 Model D
Model D is very similar to model C, except the 
dependent variable is a measure of the intensity of 
military expenditures. In other words, it is the ratio 
-of the dollar value of military expenditures to GDP. 
Once again the data come from WMEAT publications and 
the CIA World Factbook. Model D is specified as: 
INTENSE=p0+PiGDPGR+p2LNOPEN+p3LNPFI+H 
The dependent variable is intensity of military 
expenditures (INTENSE), measured as military 
expenditures as a proportion of GDP, and the other 
variables are the same as before: growth rate of GDP 
(GDPGR), log of openness to trade (LNOPEN), and the 
log of political freedom (LNPFI). Again, Po is the 
constant term and |j, is the error term.
While the sheer volume of resources spent on 
military expenditures is an important figure to look 
at when studying the military situation of a country, 
it is also important to take into consideration the
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intensity of military expenditures. For example, 
country A may have a significantly higher level of 
military expenditures than country B, but if country A 
also has a significantly higher GDP than country B, 
perhaps the two aren't all that dissimilar in 
relationship to each other's expenditures. The 
intensity variable is useful in comparing countries 
and regions of the world.
The explanatory variables for model D will be the 
same as in model C, using the same hypotheses. Once 
again those variables are the growth rate of real GDP, 
political freedom, openness to trade, and affiliation 
with NATO.
4.0 Empirical Results
All of the models were estimated using ordinary 
least squares regression analysis. The models were 
tested for the region as a whole, as well as for each 
of the selected countries to see if any patterns found 
hold up. For the regional regressions, the models were 
tested using dummy variables to control for the 
passing of time on the data.
The statistics provided on Table 1 are only for 
the region as a whole, and not for the individual 
countries.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
MEAN MINIMUM MAXIMUM STD DEVIATION
REGIONAL
TTRADE 299.39 10.00 9487.00 1027.03
BOT -34.40 -1422.10 8692.80 223.49
ME 8189.10 332.00 20000.00 1708.23
INTENSE 5.77 1.80 15.70 0.94
GDP 134297.90 348142.00 17550.00 1203.11
GDPGR -0.47 -17.5 10.6 5.79
PFI 2.49 1 7 1.34
OPEN 74.64 29.79 310.70 89.50
MILES 813.89 448 1107 60.14
NATO 1.05 0 2 0.54
4.1 Model A
Table 2: Model A: Dependent Variable TTRADE
Region** Region*** Bulgaria Czechs.
E.
Germ. Hungary Poland Romania
LNGDP 0.78*
(3-49)
0.84*
(5.95)
1.87*
(1.37)
0.74*
(3.50)
0.66
(0.04)
0.99*
(4.21)
1.23
(1.27)
0.78*
(1.42)
LNOPEN 0.18
(0.58)
0.87*
(4.34)
1.05*
(1.60)
0.38
(0.88)
0.43
(0.78)
0.32
(0.68)
0.68
(0.33)
0.05
(0.00)
LNPFI 0.71*
(2.13)
1.30*
(7.43)
-0.05
(-0.04)
0.27
0.54
0.31
(0.68)
0.89
(0.53)
-0.02
(-0.34)
-0.18
(-0.67)
LNMILES 0.41
(0.7)
-1.13*
(-2.82)
38.5
(1.2)
1.54*
(1.86)
25.60*
(1.62)
13.90*
(1.41)
17.90*
(-1.32)
41.3*
(2.1)
C -7.24*
(-1.47)
-7.96*
(-1.48)
-288*
(-1.32)
-14.3*
(-2.63)
-5.41*
(-1.57)
-23.70*
(-1.69)
-16.90*
(-3.41)
-65.9*
(-2.27)
Adj. R2 0.65 0.62 0.63 0.77 0.56 0.64 0.82 0.72
t-statistics are presented in parenthesis 
* denotes significance at the 0.80 level or better 
** regional results with dummies 
***results without dummies
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Table 2 presents the numerical regression results 
for model A. The model was tested for the region as a 
whole with and without the dummy variables. None of 
the dummy variables tested were statistically 
significant, therefore the discussion of model A that 
follows is based off of regression results where the 
dummy variables were omitted.
The estimated model for the Eastern European 
region as a whole appears to be fairly solid. An 
adjusted R2 value is often used as a measure of 
"goodness of fit." The model has an adjusted R2 of 
0.62, which implies the variance in the independent 
variables account for about 62% of. the variance in the 
dependent variable. As for the individual countries, 
all of them had adjusted R2 values indicating they 
explain over half the variance in total arms trade. 
East Germany's estimated model had the lowest,R2 
value, 0.56, while Poland has the highest, 0.82.
Adjusted R2 values alone are not enough to 
determine the significance of an estimated model. It 
is important to look at the F statistic as well. To 
accept this model with a 95% confidence level, the
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estimated F statistic for the regional model must be 
greater than the critical F statistic of 3.48. The 
actual F statistic for the regional model is 52.7. For 
the individual country models, the critical value is 
4.18, and all of the country models have F statistics 
that exceed this value.
Both the adjusted R2 values and the F 
statistics for the estimates of model A are 
encouraging. However, sometimes data similar to the 
data used in these models suffer from a problem of 
serial correlation, meaning the error terms are 
related. A way to judge if serial correlation is a 
problem is to look at the Durbin-Watson (DW) 
statistic. For the regionally estimated model, the DW 
statistic would need to be greater than 1.7 6 in order 
to reject serial correlation as a problem with 95% 
confidence. The actual DW statistic is 1.99. For the 
country-specific estimates, the DW statistics would 
also need to be above 1.7 6 for the same degree of 
confidence. East Germany's estimated model is the only 
one where serial correlation can be rejected, however 
in all of the other country-specific models, the DW
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statistics are all greater than 1.08, which puts them 
into the "inconclusive" range.
Turning now to the individual independent 
variables, it is important first to look at the t- 
statistics to determine which, if any, of the 
independent variables are statistically significant. 
For variables to be considered statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level in the 
regional model, they must have a t-statistic greater 
than 1.96. A t-statistic^greater than 1.28 would be an 
indication of significance at the 80% confidence 
level. The critical t-statistics for the country- 
specific estimates are 2.04 and 1.31 for 95% and 80% 
confidence levels, respectively.
When model A is estimated for the region as a 
whole, all of the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 95% level of 
confidence. However, this is not the case when model A 
is estimated for individual countries.
The coefficients on GDP and distance are the two 
which seem to be the most significant in individual 
countries. The coefficients on GDP are significant at
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the 95% confidence level for Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary, and at the 80% level for Bulgaria and 
Romania. The results of all of the regressions suggest 
there is a positive relationship between total arms 
trade and GDP. However this correlation is not 
significant in East Germany or Poland. The magnitude 
of the estimated coefficients also varies between the 
region and the individual countries. The results 
suggest as GDP increases, so will the level of arms 
trade, at least for the region as a whole and for a 
few of the individual countries.
The same is true for openness to trade. All of 
the regression results suggest a positive correlation 
between total arms trade and openness. The 
coefficients are most significant for the region as a 
whole, but are significant at the 80% level in 
Bulgaria. For the region as a whole, and for Bulgaria, 
the regression results suggest that as openness 
increases, so does total arms trade. This is to be 
expected, as arms trade is one component of total 
trade. If a country or region is more open to trade 
and increase imports and exports, it is rational to
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expect that most sectors of trade would increase as 
well. The important thing to note is the coefficient 
is 0.87, which indicates while increased openness to 
trade may lead to an increase arms trade, the impact 
is not that great.
Political freedom is only significant for Eastern 
Europe as a whole, however the estimated coefficient 
has the highest t-statistic of all of the estimated 
coefficients in the model. At first glance, it appears 
there is a positive correlation between arms trade and 
political freedom, which is contrary to my 
expectations. In fact, there really is a negative 
relationship between these variables, as the values 
for PFI range from 7 (least free) to 1 (most free), so 
the higher the value, the less free. Once again, 
however, it is important to note the relationship is 
only significant for Eastern Europe as a whole.
Finally, the results of the regression suggest a 
positive correlation between distance and arms trade 
for the individual countries, all of the country 
coefficients are significant at the 80% level. 
Surprisingly, though, the results of the regional
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regression suggest a negative correlation between 
distance and arms trade. A possible explanation for 
these results is that the more removed the region is 
from the military power at the time, the less arms 
trade that region will have. However, the countries 
that are closer to the military center would need less 
arms trade, as they can rely on the close proximity to 
the power center for military protection.
The coefficient for distance is actually the 
variable's elasticity. The coefficients are quite 
large which suggests that arms trade is very sensitive 
to distance.
While model A seems to provide a fairly 
significant model for determining the overall size of 
arms trade for the region as a whole, the following 
model will help to determine what factors predict if a 
country or region will be a net exporter or importer 
of arms.
4.2 Model B
Once again, the model was tested with and without 
dummy variables for time using regional data. The 
dummy variables do change the results of the
regressions. The results presented on Table 3 do not 
include the coefficients for the dummy variables, 
however those coefficients are available in the 
appendix. The following discussion is based on the 
regression results where the dummy variables were 
omitted, as they were not statistically significant.
Table 3: Model B : Dependent Variable BOT
Region** Region*** Bulgaria Czechs.
E.
Germ. Hungary Poland Romania
GDPGR -49.00*
(-2.68)
49.10*
(3.39)
15.10
(0.81)
-30.20*
(-1.60)
21.00*
(1.34)
-42.30*
(-2.41)
-33.10
(-1.17)
19.20
(0.99)
LNOPEN -4.66*
(-2.47)
-4.22*
(-2.15)
-17.60
(-0.05)
18.80
(0.79)
-23.40
(-0.12)
11.60
(0.95)
13.50
(0.84)
-17.30
(0.05)
LNPFI 110.10*
(2.29)
43.40*
(1.30)
-431.00*
(-1.35)
456.00
(3.95)
-304.00*
(-2.51)
-321.00*
(-1.71)
227.00*
(1.46)
58.60
(0.71)
C 255.10
(0.88)
149.20
(0.65)
524.00
(0.29)
962.00*
(1.00)
947.00
(0.75)
121.00
(0.67)
875.00
(0.58)
367.00
(0.98)
Adj. R2 0.59 0.56 0.63 0.54 0.57 0.54 0.67 0.55
t-stati sties are presented in parenthesis 
* denotes significance at the 0.80 level or better 
** regional results with dummies 
***results without dummies
When applied to the region as a whole, model B 
has an adjusted R2 value of 0.56, meaning that roughly 
56% of the variance in the balance of arms trade can 
be explained by the model. In order for the model to 
be statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
level, the F statistic would need to be greater than 
2.68. The estimated F statistic for the model as 
applied to Eastern Europe as a whole is 4.2. Finally,
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the regional model has a DW statistic of 1.49, which 
indicates serial correlation may be a problem.
For the individual countries, the models statistics 
are also rather promising, with all having significant 
t-statistics and adjusted R2 values greater than 0.5. 
Also, the DW statistic for the individual countries 
are better than that of the region as a whole, 
suggesting serial correlation is not a problem when 
model B is estimated for the countries.
Turning now the individual estimated 
coefficients, for the region as a whole, GDP growth 
and openness to trade are significant at the 95% 
confidence level, political freedom is significant at 
the 75% confidence level. For the individual 
countries, only political freedom is statistically 
significant at the 80% confidence level or better in 
the majority of the countries. Openness to trade is 
not significant in any of the individual country 
estimates.
The results of the model suggest there is a 
positive correlation between the growth of GDP and 
being a net exporter of arms in the cases of Eastern
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Europe as a whole, and in East Germany. However, when 
model B is applied to Czechoslovakia (which is the 
combination of data from the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia after the split) and Hungary, the regression 
results indicate a fairly large negative relationship 
between the balance of arms trade and GDP growth. It 
appears that GDP growth may affect arms trade 
differently in different cases.
The same situation occurs when the coefficients 
for political freedom are estimated. In all countries 
except Romania, the estimated coefficients are 
significant at the 80% level or better. For the region 
as a whole, along with Czechoslovakia and Poland, the 
regression results indicate a positive relationship 
between arms trade flow and political freedom, 
suggesting the more freedom, the larger the surplus of 
arms trade. The opposite result was estimated in the 
cases of Bulgaria, East Germany and Poland. These 
results suggest there may be other variables that 
interact with GDP growth and political freedom to 
affect the flow of arms trade.
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Finally, openness to trade is only significant in 
the region as a whole. The estimated coefficient is 
(-4.22) which suggests the more open Eastern Europe is 
to trade, the more likely it is to be a net importer 
of arms.
While models of arms trade do help us gain 
insight into the military sector of the region and 
individual countries, they by no means present the 
whole picture. It is important also to look at models 
of military expenditures, both in volume and 
intensity. Two models of military expenditures are 
presented next.
4.3 Model C
As was the case in the two previous models, model 
C was tested both with and without dummy variables for 
time when estimated for Eastern Europe as a whole.
Once again, the estimated coefficients for these dummy 
variables were not shown to be statistically 
significant. Table 4 shows the differences in the 
estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables, 
but does not provide the coefficients for the dummy 
variables. These coefficients along with their
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corresponding t-statistics are provided in the 
appendix.
Table 3: Model C: Dependent: Variable ME
Region** Region*** Bulgaria Czechs.
E.
Germ. Hungary Poland Romania
GDPGR -0.02*
(-2.21)
-0.02*
(-2.21)
-0.02*
(-1.69)
-0.03
(-1.15)
-0.24*
(1.44)
-0.07*
(-1.74)
-0.05*
(-1.55)
-0.04*
(-1.31)
LNOPEN -0.86*
(-8.65)
-0.86*
(-1-7)
-0.13
(-0.37)
-0.24
(-1.08)
-0.05*
(-2.34)
-0.75
(-0.98)
-0.33
(-0.98)
-0.66
(-1.20)
LNPFI 1.17*
(7.53)
1.17*
(7.53)
1.55*
(8.77)
0.37*
(1.96)
0.98*
(2.11)
2.18*
(1.42)
1.67*
(6.41)
0.95-
(3.04)
LNNATO -0.16*
(-2.10)
-0.17*
(-1.25)
-0.78*
(-2.09)
0.41*
(2.86)
-0.08
(-0.06)
0.75*
(3.41)
0.38*
(2.11)
-0.64*
(1.94)
C 10.40*
23.40
10.40*
23.40
5.23*
(3.24)
10.35*
(6.60)
6.60*
(8.51)
2.54*
3.94
1.47*
(8.54)
11.20*
(1-34)
Adj. R2 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.97 0.93 0.94 0.95 0.92
t-statistics are presented in parentheses 
* denotes significance at the 0.80 level or better 
** regional results with dummies 
***results without dummies
Model C is obviously quite strong as a model. For 
all of the cases, the adjusted R2 values are all 
greater than 0.9, suggesting the model explains over 
90% of the variance in military expenditures. All of 
the F values are well above the critical value of 3.32 
needed for 99% confidence. While the DW statistics 
indicate there may be some serial correlation in the 
Bulgarian and Romanian estimates, serial correlation 
is not a problem in the regional estimates.
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Of all the explanatory variables, political 
freedom is the most significant. For every case, the 
estimated coefficients on political freedom are 
significant at the 80% level or better. All of the 
coefficients are positive, suggesting as political 
freedom increases, military expenditures will decline. 
Recall that a high value for PFI indicates a lower 
level of political freedom.
The coefficients are measurements of elasticity, 
which is an indication of how sensitive the dependent 
variable is to fluctuations in the independent 
variable. Any value greater than one is indicative of 
a very elastic, or responsive dependent variable.
This suggests political freedom has a very large and 
significant effect on military expenditures in all 
cases. The only possible exception is the case of 
Czechoslovakia, where the coefficient is estimated to 
be 0.37.
The coefficients for GDP growth are significant 
at the 80% confidence level in all of the countries 
except Czechoslovakia. It is significant at the 95% 
level for Eastern Europe as a whole. All of the
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coefficients have negative signs, suggesting that as 
GDP growth increases, military expenditures do indeed 
fall. However it is important to note that, in most 
cases, the coefficients are rather small. The largest 
coefficient estimated is for East Germany, with a 
value of -0.24.
A new variable, affiliation with NATO was found 
to be significant at the 95% level in all cases except 
in the region as a whole and in Hungary. In those two 
cases, the estimated coefficients were not significant 
even at the 80% level of confidence. There is a fairly 
noticeable variation between the magnitudes of the 
coefficients as well as in their signs. For example, 
the Bulgarian case has an estimated coefficient of - 
0.78 whereas the Hungarian coefficient has an estimate 
of 0.75. These varied results suggest the other 3 
explanatory variables likely interact with the NATO 
variable to affect military expenditures.
Finally, openness to trade is very significant 
„for Eastern Europe as a whole, with a t-statistic of 
“8.65 and a rather large coefficient of -0.86.
However, the only other case where openness to trade
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is significant is in East Germany. The estimated 
coefficient is much smaller in the East German, case 
than in the regional case, though. This suggests that 
as openness to trade increases in the entire Eastern 
European region, that military expenditures will 
decline.
All of the results in model C are in accordance 
with those hypothesized earlier in this study. The 
model does appear to be a very useful and significant 
predictor of military expenditures, especially when 
applied to Eastern Europe as a whole. While the volume 
of military expenditures is certainly a useful piece 
of data, it is also important to consider the 
intensity of military expenditures. In other words, 
how much of GDP is made up of military expenditures. A 
final model developed in this study deals with the 
intensity of military expenditures.
4.4 Model D
Recall this final model has the intensity of 
military expenditures, as defined by military 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP, as the dependent 
variable. The three explanatory variables are growth
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rate of real GDP, political freedom, and openness to 
trade. Once again, the model was estimated for the 
region both with and without dummy variables to 
account for time. The estimated coefficients on the 
dummy variables themselves were not statistically 
significant and are available in the appendix.
Table 5: Model D : Dependent Variable INTENSE
Region** Region*** Bulgaria Czechs.
E.
Germ. Hungary Poland Romania
GDPGR -0.02*
(-3.03)
-0.20*
(-3.03)
0.00
(-0.81)
-0.03*
(-2.37)
-0.02
(-0.52)
-0.03
(-1-20)
0.00
(-0.55)
-0.02
(-0.55)
LNOPEN 0.00
(-0.10)
0.00
(0.00)
0.35
(1.11)
0.00*
(134)
1.10
(0.70)
0.74
(0.64)
10.30
(0.44)
0.37
(120)
LNPFI 0.78*
(13.90)
0.78*
(14.00)
1.07*
(4.17)
0.02
(0.30)
0.64*
(1.60)
0.868
(3.21)
0.97*
(1.58)
0.75*
(1.70)
C 0.45*
(1.51)
0.45*
(1.52)
-942.00
(0.00)
-0.27
(-0.09)
-36.00
(0.01)
34.30
0.23
-521.00
(0.37)
-115.00
(0.61)
Adj. R2 .054 0.53 0.96 0.80 0.79 0.84 0.67 0.88
t-statistics are presented in parentheses 
* denotes significance at the 0.80 level or better 
** regional results with dummies 
***results without dummies
Once again, the F statistics for all cases are 
larger than the critical values. The adjusted R2 
values are also above 0.5 in all cases. Finally, the 
DW statistics indicate that serial correlation is not 
a problem in any of the cases.
The estimated coefficient for political freedom 
appears to be the most statistically significant of
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The four models that were developed and estimated 
in this study do provide some valuable insight into 
what affects the military situations in Eastern 
Europe. All of the models estimated seem to be more 
applicable to the region of Eastern Europe as a whole 
than to the individual countries. This suggests that 
military affairs, such as arms trade issues and 
military expenditure issues, tend to be affected more 
by regional matters than by country-specific ones.
With the increasing regionalism that is emerging 
throughout the globe, this suggestion is not 
surprising. The final section of this study will 
review the major conclusions reached from this study 
as well as policy implications and suggestions for 
further study.
5.0 Conclusions
5.1 Findings
The most important finding of this study is the 
importance of political freedom. In all four models, 
and increase in political freedom was shown to be 
associated with a desired trait, i.e. less trade in 
arms, lower military expenditures, etc.
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all the explanatory variables. It is significant at 
the 80% confidence level in all cases except for the 
Czech case. All of the estimated coefficients are at 
least 0.64 and are all positive. These results suggest 
that as political freedom increases, the intensity of 
military expenditures will decline. The larger 
coefficients indicate the relationship is an elastic 
one.
GDP growth is the next most significant of the 
variables. It is significant at the 95% confidence 
level when estimated for the region as well as for 
Czechoslovakia. The coefficients are negative, and 
rather small, suggesting that as GDP growth increases, 
the intensity of military expenditures will decline, 
but not a great deal.
Finally, openness to trade is only significant at 
the 80% level in the case of Czechoslovakia, however 
the estimated coefficient is effectively zero. This 
suggests that openness to trade does not have any 
statistically significant effect upon the intensity of 
military expenditures.
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Openness to trade does also seem to be associated 
with a desired trait of lower military expenditures in 
Eastern Europe. Other significant indicators of lower 
military expenditures are more political freedoms, 
positive GDP growth, and a relationship with NATO.
5.2 Policy Implications
As was mentioned in the beginning of this study, 
there are many people who believe the world is on the 
brink of another arms race coupled with dangerously 
high levels of military spending. While many would 
agree with my assertion that the bi-polar balance of 
power that existed during the Cold-War era was a far 
more stable international system than the unbalanced, 
multi-polar world we live in currently.
If a new arms trade were to begin, it is highly 
unlikely the world would once again divide itself into 
a neatly bipolar international system. At the very 
least, the new arms race would likely trigger a tri- 
polar system with the US, Russia, and China all 
competing for superiority. A multi-polar system is 
inherently unstable, and the instability is more 
worrisome when arms stockpiles are on the rise.
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Therefore it is critical to take steps to inhibit the 
emergence of another international arms race.
Military expenditures are once again on the rise. 
The Regan administration ushered in an era of 
astronomically high military expenditures that some 
claim had a serious, negative impact upon the economy 
of the United States as well as the global economy. 
While military expenditures are certainly necessary 
and beneficial, it is important to be able to keep 
them in check to avoid running unhealthy budget 
deficits.
5.3. Suggestions for Future Studies
The weakest model in this study is model D. The 
only significant variable in model D is political 
freedom. More studies need to be done to find out what 
other variables influence the intensity of military 
expenditures.
Further research also needs to be done on the 
role played by NATO with regard to military 
expenditures. Recall that the estimated coefficients 
for NATO in the model of military expenditures took on 
both negative and positive values. It would be
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interesting to further divide the NATO variable into 
the two strategic regions that NATO is developing in 
Eastern Europe. A similar tiered system was also 
present in the Warsaw Pact. It would be very 
interesting to divide the data into these tiers and 
see what results are generated.
Like the NATO coefficients, the estimated 
coefficient for political freedom with regard to the 
direction of arms trade also took on both negative and 
positive values. More study needs to be done to 
determine under what circumstances do these 
coefficients take on negative and positive values.
All of the models discussed throughout this study 
are more applicable to Eastern Europe as a whole, as 
opposed to the individual countries that constitute 
Eastern Europe for the purpose of this study. The 
strongest of these four models is model C. It would be 
interesting to see if the highly significant results 
estimated for this model in the case of Eastern Europe 
would also be generated for other regions of the 
world.
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Appendix: Estimated Coefficients for Dummy Variables
Model A Model B Model C Model D
DUM70 -0.16
(-0.19)
-502
(-0.06)
0.1
(0.41)
-0.12
(-0.08)
DUM71 -0.14
(-0.26)
-513
(-0.12)
0.09
(0.37)
-0.05
(-0.31)
UUM72 -0.46
(-0.1)
-730
(-0.19)
0.09
(0.36)
0.08
(0.45)
DUM73 0.08
(0.46)
-1148
(-0.28)
0.10)
(0.36)
0.06
(0.33)
DUM74 -0.03
(-0.06)
-1023
(-0.25)
0.11
(0.39)
-0.12
(0.63)
DUM75 -0.03
(-0.06)
-935
(-0.22)
0.12
(0.38)
-0.12
(-0.63)
DUM76 -0.26
(-0.57)
1014
(-0.2)
0.12
(0-37)
0.15
(0.08)
DUM77 -0.37
(-0.78)
-895
(-0.22)
0.12
(0.37)
-0.18
(-0.09)
DUM78 -0.34
(-0.74)
-791
(-0.19)
0.13
(0.37)
-0.23
(-0.11)
DUM79 -0.6
(-0-13)
-860
(-0.21)
0.13
(0.37)
-0.27
(-0.14)
DUM80 -.045
(-0.09)
-743
(-0.18)
0.13
(0.37)
-0.26
(-0.13)
DUM81 -0.3
(-0.06)
-561
(-0.14)
0.14
(0.39)
-0.23
(-0.12)
DUM82 0.13
(0.6)
1338
(0.33)
0.14
(0.4)
-0.18
(-0.09)
DUM83 -0.17
(-0.61)
-467
(-0.12)
0.15
(0.44)
-0.13
(-0.63)
DUM84 -0.14
(-0.3)
-253
(-0.62)
0.15
(0.44)
-0.18
(0.09)
DUM85 0.4
(0.87)
-566
(-0.14)
0.16
(0.49)
-0.04
(-0.24)
DUM86 0.58
(1.2)
-936
(-0.23)
0.17
(0.49)
0.29
(0.15)
DUM87 0.18
(0.38)
-589
(-0.15)
0.17
(0.53)
0.27
(0.14)
DUM88 0
(0.01)
-714
(-0.18)
0.17
(0.55)
0.23
(0.12)
DUM89 -0.55
(-1.18)
-718*
(-1.69)
0.18
(0.56)
0.4
(0.19)
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A p p e n d ix  C o n tin u e d
DUM90 0.23
(0.49)
1183
(-0.25)
0.14
(0.40)
0.59
(0.25)
DUM91 -0.16
(-0.24)
-613
(-0.13)
0.10
(0.30)
-0.03
(-0.16)
DUM92 -0.18
(0.37)
-446
(-0.01)
0.06
(0.18)
-0.03
(-0.16)
DUM93 -0.14
(-0.27)
-503
(-1-15)
0.00
(0.06)
-0.13
(-0.60)
DUM94 0.2
(0.4)
-17.7
(-0.04)
0.03
(0.11)
-0.29
(-1.38)
DUM95 -0.13
(-0.29)
-6.87
(-0.00)
0.42
(0-15)
-0.20
(-0.10)
DUM96 -0.03
(-0.07)
-96
(-0.23)
0.36
(0.15)
-0.33
(-0.16)
DUM97 0.05
(0.24)
-0.38
(0.18)
DUM98 0.22
(0.14)
-0.40
(-0.19)
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